62 d Congress') 
Sd Session / 


senatp: 


f Document 
\ No. 1092 


Give the Constitution a Chance 


THE 

ELECTORAL COLLEGE 

PREROGATIVES AND POSSIBILITIES 
A PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE VOTE 
THE PRESIDENT’S TERM 

By 

JOHN WALKER HOLCOMBE 



PRESENTED BY MR. SHIVELY 
Febp jary 18, 1913.—Ordered to be printed 


WASHINGTON 

19U. 















D. OF D. 
MAR 8 1313 









THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


I. Prerogatives and Possibilities. 

(From the Forum for November, 1912.) 

The devolution of the executive power has ever been the weak spot 
in systems of government. When ancient nations outgrew the primi¬ 
tive idea of the divinity of their kings, the problem of transmission 
of supreme power from ruler to ruler was solved by the strong man 
with the sword. With the exception of the few most enlightened 
peoples for comparatively brief periods of their career, the progress 
of nations has been checkered by wars and massacres to determine the 
sovereignty. 

The governments of Europe enjoyed little stability till the princi¬ 
ple of hereditary succession became fixed in their constitutions. 
Where this principle Avas imperfectly recognized there was turmoil; 
Avhere it failed entirely extinction followed. It is not necessary to 
cite illustrations of these propositions from English and Continental 
or ancient history, nor to argue the perils of republics in the revolu¬ 
tions of our American neighbors. 

Therefore, when a people undertake to select their own rulers the 
method of doing so is of the utmost importance. In its every step, 
in all its procedure, it must be simple, direct, easily understood. 
There must be no elaborate and involved minutise out of which con¬ 
fusion may arise or into which uncertainty may be injected by design¬ 
ing persons. 

‘ NEW AVAY CHOSEN. 

When our ancestors threw off royal rule the old ])roblem faced 
them, and in the Constitutional Convention this was regarded as one 
of the most difficult problems. There were no satisfactory precedents. 
Many of the Delegates were versed in history, but they learned there¬ 
from of the wreckage of states through feebleness of the executive 
poAver or imperfect methods of its transmission. After most careful 
consideration of various plans they adopted the method of election of 
the President by Electors “ appointed ” in the sev^eral States and equal 
in number to the Senators and Kepresentatives in Congress. They 
rejected, after thorough discussion, the proposal of election by suf¬ 
frage of all the voters, possibly because they distrusted the people, as 
has been alleged;, perhaps also because they saw that election by gen¬ 
eral ballot A\muld not be a real choosing by the people. 

The persons to be voted for must be selected, designated, nominated 
by some mortal agency. That agency, unless a jingle dictator, must 
be a body of men small enough for discussion. Cpnsequently some 





4 


THE ELECTOKAL COLLEGE. 


junta or caucus would dictate candidates; that is, select the Presi¬ 
dent. In order that this service might not fall to an irresponsible 
oligarchic body, the authors of the Constitution created a responsible 
body, clothed with full and final poAver to both choose and elect, exer¬ 
cising this poAver under the solemn sanction of an oath of office and 
duty to the people, by Avhom noAv they are directly elected. This 
body Avas to represent as nearly as possible the States and the people 
of the Slates and to embody their highest Avisdom and virtue. Meet¬ 
ing as “ a Grand Electoral College,” it Avas to be at once the nomi¬ 
nating convention and plenary electiAe agency of the Xation. 

ELECTORS PARALYZED. 

There can be no doubt but the Electoral College in this form Avould 
have proved itself a reality, Avould have vindicated its prerogatives 
and actually chosen our Presidents to this day. Its members Avould 
not have tolerated dictation from Avithout. but Avould have procured 
immunity from pressure and undue influence through protective 
statutes enforced by the courts. But most unluckily the convention 
changed its perfected plan at the last moment, and thereby unAvit- 
tingly negatived its own Avill. In apprehension of the difficulties 
and expense of travel in that day, the electors Avere permitted to 
meet and vote in their several States. Thus the poAver of making 
a choice Avas annihilated—the electors Avere paralyzed in their essen¬ 
tial function. 

Bancroft summarizes substantially as folloAvs : 

And now the whole inarch to the mode of election of the President may be 
surveyed. The Constitutional Convention at first reluctantly conferred that 
office on the National Legislature, voting in joint ballot. To escape from danger 
of cabal and corruption, it next transferred full and final power of choice 
to an electoral college that should be the exact counterpart of the joint con¬ 
vention of the two Houses of Congress in the representation of the States, as 
well as the population of the States, and should meet at the seat of goA^ernment. 
* « * From confidence in the purity of the electoral body thus established, 

the reeligibility of the Executive was again affirmed. * * " Then, fearing 

that so large a number of men would not travel to the seat of government for 
that single purpose, or might be hindered on the Avay, * * * nor would the 

first characters in the State feel sufficient motives to undertake the electoral 
office, * * * the thought arose that the electors might cast their votes in 

their own .several States and transmit the certificates of the votes to the (xen- 
eral Legislature. (History of the Constitution, A^ol. II, p. 184.) 

Why the fatal result of this afterthought Avas not foreseen may 
be partly explained by conditions then existing. In the person of 
Washington, the immediate candidate for all electoral votes needed 
uo nomination, and several other statesmen stood forth so dis¬ 
tinguished by great services that the inevitableness of contemporary 
selections obscured the fact that the first step in the process—the 
agreement upon a person on Avhom enough votes could be concen¬ 
trated to effect an election—would be the prime difficulty of all. 
Also, the committee of correspondence was a familiar agency of 
that time. Through committees of correspondence, worked up by 
the Revolutionary patriots in the New England toAvns and in the 
counties of the Middle and Southern colonies, public sentiment had 
been roused and united, agreement on policies and concert of action 
I'rought about. By their means, ’ conA^entions had been called and 
tlie colonial assemblies had been influenced to send delegates to the 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


5 


Continental Congress; all the machinery which carried through the 
war for independence and the formation of the Constitution had 
been created. The expedient of correspondence among the electors 
might be used to effect a unity of choice. But if this was regarded 
as the appropriate means, it was speedily nullified, not only by other 
influences, but by legislation which required the electors to give 
Rud certify their votes one month after their own election, allowing 
no sufficient time for correspondence. (The time was extended by 
an act of 1887 to the second Monday in January.) 

However this may be. as soon as it became necessary really to make 
and agree upon a choice the electors found themselves poAverless to 
do so. They therefore accepted such advice as was tendered or 
forced upon them from without. In the early years of the Republic 
the needed advice was supplied by various self-constituted caucuses 
or committees, which in turn assumed the function, until finally, with 
the stronger organization of political parties, the national nominat¬ 
ing convention became an established institution. Now the choice is 
actually made by a voluntary extra-legal and irresponsible convention, 
or some clique within such a convention. It is accomplished, not 
through wise deliberations, but through every art of political strat¬ 
egy. accompanied with excitement and uproar. The reality of this 
extralegal choice is not affected b}^ the custom that two or more con¬ 
ventions present rival candidates, from whom the people indirectly 
select one. The fact remains that one of these conventions chooses 
the President in the first instance and thus usurps the power of a con¬ 
stitutional body elected by the people. In so doing it usurps the 
rights of the people themselves. 

That the people are aAvare of and deeply dissatisfied with this 
usurpation of their rights by irresponsible conventions is evidenced 
b}^ the rapid spread of the system of primary elections, the enact¬ 
ments of several States, and the numerous bills in State legislatures 
and in Congress proposing to elect delegates to party conventions by 
popular vote and to instruct them as to candidates by party primaries. 
This paper endeavors to show that such bills as to presidential elec¬ 
tions are framed on erroneous principles. 

HARD TO DEVISE PLAN. 

In the first place, the law ought not to attempt to control politics. 
In his politics and religion the citizen is free. It has ever been our 
theory that the voluntary activities of citizens in forming parties, 
assembling in conventions, and caiwing on political campaigns are 
outside the sphere of law; that legislation is for the whole people, 
recognizing no sects, parts, or parties. Accordingly, it is improper 
for the law to prescribe the election of delegates or provide for in¬ 
structing them or regulate the holding of conventions. But the law 
mav altogether prohibit such activities, whether in or out of conven¬ 
tions, so far as they impair the freedom of any constitutional agency 
of the Government. 

Furthermore, it is believed that no plan of electing delegates to 
partv conventions and expressing presidential preferences and cer- 
tifving such preferences and instructing such delegates can be devised, 
which will not violate the necessary rule of simplicity and seriously 
impair the political liberties of the citizen. On inspection of a few 


6 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


proposed bills, one is astonished at the elaborate and complicated pro¬ 
visions and minute instructions and enormous expense found neces¬ 
sary to make the system effective. The enactment of such a measure 
would raise up a class of specialist lawyers and professional politi¬ 
cians to operate it, and the consequent reign of confusion is frightful 
to contemplate. 

Again, it is doubtful whether the people would remain satisfied 
with such a system. They have recognized the abuses of huge con¬ 
ventions, which become more glaring with each perpetration. The 
people are turning to the primary election, which they desire as 
a substitute for, not an aggravation of, the nominating convention. 
They wish to express their preferences among presidential candi¬ 
dates, but they do not wish their expression to pass through the 
medium of party conventions. Such a medium is highly undesirable, 
and it is emphatically urged that it be not fixed by law upon our 
electoral system. 

To complicate the preferential primary with the national conven¬ 
tions would be a calamity of the first magnitude. Little less calam¬ 
itous would be the elaborate hierarcliy of State boards and national 
boards, composed of salaried members appointed by the President, 
which are the substitutes proposed for the certifying function of 
party conventions. The extent to which these bills propose to regu¬ 
late elections appears to infringe upon the province of the State leg¬ 
islatures, to which the Constitution gives the power to determine the 
manner of appointing the Electors. All these difficulties are avoidevL 
by prohibiting any form of dictation either to the people as voters 
at large or to their chosen Electors. Let there be party organizations 
to proclaim and promote party principles, but let there be no nomi¬ 
nating of candidates for President by caucuses, conventions, or pe¬ 
titions in advance of the general election. Party activity may be 
directed to the nomination of candidates for electors to be chosen 
under State laAvs. Here party organizations may have free scope to 
Iming forward robust partisans, who, if chosen electors, will fight 
vigorously for party principles and party men. 

\, ELECTORS SHOULD MEET. 

The influence of the people will be profoundly felt by the electors. 
They are the responsible agents, elected and commissioned by the 
people; they are themselves of and from the people, among Avhom 
they live and move and have their being. They know and feel the 
popular sentiments, in which they fully share, and in the performance 
of their duties they will prove a sensitive reflector of public opinion. 
Why, then, should there be two or three or more enormous assemblies 
to pervert or color the popular will, when the Constitution has 
created a body duly elected, authorized, and competent to receive and 
express that will? It is only necessary to call it together. 

In those words is the key to the question. While the Constitution 
requires the electors to meet and vote in their several States, it no¬ 
where prohibits them from assembling in a body for consultation. 
Indeed, as has been shown above, such was the perfect plan in its 
original form. They were to meet in convention and both choose 
and elect. The change which rendered them powerless to choose 
was made on account of the expense and difficulty of travel, a reason 


THE ELECTOKAL COLLEGE. 


7 


which no longer exists. - The reason having passed for that feature 
which defeated their excellent plan, it seems a duty to our Eevolu- 
tionary fathers to eliminate the obstruction and make their plan 
workable. Let the electors be called together to nominate candidates 
and then return to their States to cast and certify their votes. For 
this no amendment to the Constitution is necessary, nor, theoretically, 
the enactment of any law. They have a perfect right to do ^is of 
their own motion, and no court nor magistrate could say thSffinay. 
If the electors appointed November 5 should immediately assemble 
m the city of St. Louis and agree to elect Senator La Follette Presi¬ 
dent and Eepresentative Underwood Vice President, and should 
afterwards cast a majority of votes for those gentlemen in the manner 
prescribed by law, such election would be valid in every respect. 
But practically the electors can not hold a convention without help 
from Congress. Dispersed over the whole country and without or¬ 
ganization or power of initiative, they can not well agree upon a 
place of meeting and make preliminary arrangements ; nor can they 
be expected to render such service without compensation and at their 
own expense. Congress should, therefore, provide for the meeting 
of the electoral college in convention at some city centrally located 
and make suitable appropriation therefor. 

For other reasons legislation is necessary. Electors can not and 
will not disregard the dictation of party conventions, so long estab¬ 
lished in the thought and customs of the land. As has been argued 
above, the law ought not to regulate the voluntary political activities 
of citizens; but it ought to prohibit all activities which impair the 
freedom of any lawful agency of the Government. There are laws to 
protect the Congress and its Members in their absolute freedom; laws 
to protect the Executive and the courts. Now the Electoral College, 
let it be repeated again and again, is a governmental agency of the 
highest importance, embedded in the Constitution itself and clothed 
with the most solemn responsibility. Accordingly, the nomination of 
candidates for President or Vice President by unauthorized agencies 
or assemblies should be prohibited. 

SYSTEM L\ PRACTICE. 

It may be interesting to consider how the system here advocated 
would work in practice. Assume that in the year 1916 there have 
been no nominating conventions and no persons have been proclaimed 
candidates for President and Vice President. The Electors number¬ 
ing 531, have been chosen at the November elections by direct vote 
of the people, and Congress has designated a central city and made 
suitable appropriation for the meeting. The College assembles, 
chooses temporary officers in the usual manner, by whom the roll of 
members is made up. and the body conducted to a permanent parlia¬ 
mentary organization. 

The iCollege adopts such rules as may be necessary for its special 
work and proceeds to business. Candidates will naturally be pre¬ 
sented in nominating speeches, and there will be a lining up of Elec¬ 
tors by parties. If the smaller parties of the country—the Socialist, 
the Prohibitionist, Woman’s Suffrage, or Labor Party—have chosen 
any electors, these will doubtless make themselves heard and may 
wield some influence. Under present conditions, the real contest 



8 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


Avill be between Republicans and Democrats. Party caucuses will be 
held, in which different factions will contend for their favorites, 
iind the name agreed upon by the Electors of each party will be sub¬ 
mitted to the College, j The voting will be conducted in any manner 
the body may order, viva voce, by count of heads, by call of the roll, 
by ballot, or otherwise, and if one party has a majority a nomination 
will easily be made. If there be no majority of any party, there 
being three or more parties represented, the situation may become 
difficult, but always less difficult and with better chances of solution 
than in elections by the House of Representatives under existing con¬ 
stitutional rules, r The College will appreciate its imperative duty 
to nominate a candidate who will receive in the formal election a 
majority of all the electoral a otes. The wisdom and patriotism of 
such an assemblage will find a Avay. A rule of elimination, dropping 
the name or names lowest on the list after each A^oting, would speedily 
effect a nomination, and enough members of the least numerous party 
or parties might pledge their electoral Azotes to the candidate thus 
named to assure his election.^- A candidate for Vice President haAdng 
been chosen in the same manner, the electors Avill return to the sev¬ 
eral States and, assembling in their capitals on the day appointed 
by law, will give, certify, and transmit their Azotes in the regular 
manner, the nominees of the conAention receiving a safe majority. 
Indeed, so beneficent a change in our party life might be expected 
Avith the disappearance of long and irritating personal campaigns 
that after a fair and open contest in the assembled College the formal 
election might often be practically unanimous. *» 

Thus the election need never be throAvn into the House of Rep¬ 
resentatives—an expedient Avhich has proved in the past unsatis¬ 
factory and perilous. Witness our narroAv escape from the election 
of Aaron Burr, averted by the change of a single vote after many 
ballots; witness the deep chagrin of a growing majority at the defeat 
of Gen. Jackson, engendering bitterness Avhich surAUA^ed many years; 
Avitness also the extreme perils of the Hayes-Tilden controversy. 
And the present situation is very graA^e. \rhe uncertainties of an 
election by the existing House have been forciblj^ pointed out. The 
declaration of nominees in several States that if chosen Electors they 
Avill Amte for candidates other than those of their party: the efforts 
to enjoin such action in the courts; the resignation of nominees from 
the electoral ticket; the projection of rival tickets into the field denote 
confusion which may in a feAv Aveeks develop into a contest as unde¬ 
sirable as any in the past. ^ 

ri. A Presidential Preference Vote. 

[From the Forum for December. 1912.] 

In a former article it Avas urged that Congress, by a brief enact¬ 
ment, assist the electors to assemble in convention for the purpose of 
nominating candidates for President and Vice President, and pro¬ 
hibit conventions and other extra-legal agencies from forestalling 
the choice of the Electoral College. It Avas shown that the Electors 
have the constitutional right so to assemble and nominate, and that 
party coiiA^entions are purely voluntary, irresponsible bodies, acting 
Avithout Avarrant of law. 



THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


9 


hy there was no legislation in early days to give efficacy to the 
constitutional mode of selecting the President when it was found 
the electors were powerless to choose, may easily be imagined. Be¬ 
fore the situation was understood the legislative department had 
assumed to itself the poAver of nomination through caucuses of its 
members, and if it occurred to them that Congress Avas in dutA" 
bound to provide a way for the Electoral College to exercise its 
powers they Avere doubtless blinded by their oavh partisan ambitions. 
Noav, hoAveA^er, since the function of nomination has been usurped by 
other agencies, the Congress may see the Avisdom of restoring it to 
the constitutional body to Avhich it rightfully belongs. 

The Electors are ‘‘appointed” by direct vote of the people. 
Though elected on a general State ticket, it is the invariable custom 
to put on that ticket a resident of every congressional district.. Thus 
the Electors are known personally or by reputation to the people 
among whom they live. They may be designated by primary elec¬ 
tions, and they constitute a truly representative body, knoAving and 
sharing in the opinions of their constituents. They are a fit body to 
choose the President, because they are a sensitive index of public 
opinion. This reason influenced the constitutional conA’ention in 
determining the mode of election, the mode adopted being thought 
the best of all that were proposed to interpret and carry out the 
people’s Avill. 

GouA^erneur Morris wrote, in 1801: 

It was inferred that the mode least favorable to intrigue and corruption, 
that in which the unbiased voice of the people will be most attended to, and 
that which will be least likely to terminate in violence and nsnrpntion. ought 
to be adopted. 

And the Federalist, No. 68. 

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of 
the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will 
be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished 
body but to men chosen for the special purpose and at the particular con¬ 
juncture. 

LEFT TO OAVX JUDOAfEXT. 

But to know the Avill of the people the Electors Avere left to their 
own understanding. No systematic method of the people themsehTs 
expressing their will Avas provided. Indeed, such method could not 
be provided in that age. Methods of voting were extremely crude, 
and it is only in our own day that a really effective ballot has been 
devised, while the idea of primary elections of candidates is most 
recent. Meantime, to aid the Electors, left poAverless by the require¬ 
ment to give their Amtes in their respective States, nominating con¬ 
ventions sprang up, and they liaA-e attained a rank groAvth, imposing 
upon the Electors as the Avill of the people the results of Homeric 
wrangles of politicians. 

But the day of the convention is said to be past. Since the highly 
imedifying spectacles of last summer nearly eAery neAvspaper and 
periodical has so predicted, in language more or less temperate, the 
following in an esteemed contemporary being taken as a sample: 

With the horrible example of this year’s fluke staring them in the face, would 
Congress be willing again to trust the old corrupt, vicious, broken-down system 
of nominating a President? 


10 


THE ELECTOBAL COLLEGE. 


Our judicious historians entertain the same opinion. Or. James 
Schouler wrote in 1908: 

We have changed in national modes of nomination and are likely to change 
again. Nominations by a congressional caucus, the earliest settled practice, 
passed into disrepute and disuse some 80 years ago, nor did the plan of State 
nomination by legislatures long satisfy as a substitute. .National party nomi¬ 
nation in convention by delegates from all the States, our present mode, is 
already an expensive contrivance, not to add loosely representative in character, 
and each new experience increases its cumbrous inconvenience. Some other 
method must presently be contrived. (Ideals of the Republic, p. 229.) 

Though many a political convention has been a public scandal, 
yet much may be said for the convention as an institution. It is a 
spontaneous growth of our political life, serving greatly to awaken 
interest in affairs of government, to inform and formulate public 
opinion; also it has been fairly successful. The national convention, 
supplying a deficiency in the Federal Constitution, has generally pre¬ 
sented a statesman or soldier of distinction and ability. However, 
it is an excrescence upon the body politic and ought to go, and with 
it the whole fabric of presidential campaigns, of which it is the 
foundation. The country has grown too big for the system, the con¬ 
ventions too unwieldy, the expenses too enormous, the excitement 
too intense. This, v^ld apply with even greater force to an election 
of President by direct ^pulaf vote. 

TOO MUCH PARTISANSHIP. 

We have too much of parties and partisanship. Our nation-wide 
campaign is a gigantic evil; its unifying influence no longer needed, 
its educative value negative, its vast expenditure worse than waste, 
its irritating effects thoroughly unwholesome. The shameless vitu¬ 
peration of public men, the unscrupulous misrepresentation of poli¬ 
cies, the lurid picturing of outrages past and horrors to come, have 
too often roused the unthinking to madness, and may be held respon¬ 
sible for the assassination of one-third of our Presidents elected since 
the Civil War. With this evil record, the worst among modern 
nations, we still industriously cultivate the tree that bears such fruit, 
our system of frenzied politics. But let the personal element be 
eliminated and the President be found without candidates and with¬ 
out campaigns. Hero worship, loyalty to the chief, has been of much 
social value in past ages, but it is a sentiment now fit rather for 
subjects of an empire than for enlightened citizens of a republic. 
We boast that we are ruled by law, not by men. Therefore, let us 
attend more to policies and measures than to the personality of can¬ 
didates. So shall our political development be along intellectual 
lines, promotive of a higher prosperity. 

The substitute offered for conventions is the nomination of can- 
••didates by primary elections, each party voting separately among 
candidates designated in advance by petition or some such method. 
The objections of confusion, cumbrousness, intricacy, and expense, in 
attempts to apply this scheme to presidential elections, were discussed 
in the former article referred to; but also this sj^stem recognizes, and 
perpetuates by law, parties and party organizations. In view of 
the developed political capacity of the electorate, it is right and 
possible for the people to express their Avishes respecting candidates 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


11 


for the offices of Government, and the best means possible should be 
devised for a full and effective expression thereof. But by no means 
should the presidential preference pass through the medium of party 
conventions. Such a medium is wholly unnecessary and altogether 
obstructive. Most emphatically it is urged that the people, in under¬ 
taking to advise respecting the presidency, address their advice 
directly to the responsible agents commissioned by them and vested 
by them with authority to act thereon—that is. the Electoral College 
lawfully assembled. 

SIMPLE METHOD PROPOSED. 

This desirable expression of presidential preferences by the voters 
at large may be given in a simple and effective manner, with scarcely 
any addition to the labor involved in casting and collecting the 
ballots. Xaturally the preference vote should be given in connection 
with the vote for electors, and such would be the case in practice; 
but in legislating upon the subject, in order to avoid all questions of 
validity, inasmuch as the power to determine the manner of “ ap¬ 
pointing” the Electors is vested in the State legislatures. Congress 
would wisel}^ connect this vote with the vote for Bepresentatives, a 
subject over which that body has complete jurisdiction, as is placed 
beyond doubt by the Supreme Court in the following language: 

So in the case of laws regulating the elections of Representatives to Congress 
the State may make regulations on the subject; Congress may make regulations 
on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made. The para¬ 
mount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those 
made by the State, so far as the two are incompatible, and no further. (Ex 
parte Siebold, 100 U. S., 386. See also ex parte Yarborough, 110 U. S., 6.51; 
and Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S., 62.) 

A paragraph in the act for assembling the electoral college should 
provide that in the years when a President is to be elected there 
shall be printed on the ballots used in voting for Representatives in 
I Congress words to this effect, “ Here the voter may write the name of 
his choice for President of the United States,” and below them a blank 
line; and when the ballots are counted in each State all names writ¬ 
ten on said line by the voters which have received more than 1,000 
votes each shall be tabulated with the number of votes for each, and 
the tabulation shall be certified to the Electors and shall be published. 

When the Electors assemble in convention, those from each State 
will present the tabulation with which they have been provided, and 
thereupon a consolidated table will be compiled showing in proper 
order all the names that have received more than 1,000 votes 
in any State, the number of votes given to every name in each State, 
and the total number of votes for every name in the whole Union. 
Remember, that the people have, without prior nominations or dic¬ 
tation from any source, out of their own knowledge and best wis¬ 
dom, given these votes. The Electors Avill thus have reported to them 
the real voice of the people, but speaking a various language. From 
every State there may be several or many names, and without doubt 
the best-qualified men of the Nation will be in the lists. It will be the 
task of the Electors to analyze the lists and determine what is the 
highest expression of the people’s will. They will mark a number 
of names that have received the largest totals of votes and those 
whose votes are derived from the greatest number of States, and 


12 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


among those found to be general favorites they will consider the ele¬ 
ments of distinction, past services, and qualifications. Each Elector 
will give to the varying elements such weight as his own judgment 
and conscience approve, and the results of their deliberations can 
not fail to be more satisfactory to an enlightened country than are 
the fortuitous conclusions of our national conventions. 

As judges. Senators, and Representatives are protected by law in 
the performance of official duty, so the Electors should be assured of 
perfect independence and guarded from all sinister influence by a 
carefully drawn corrupt-practices act. 

ELECTION OF ELECTORS. 

To complete the discussion of this question something should be 
said of the manner of appointing ” the Electors, though this is not 
Avithin Federal jurisdiction. Being left to the State legislatures, 
various modes were employed, each suited doubtless to local condi¬ 
tions. In certain States the legislatures themselves appointed them, 
in others they were elected by congressional districts, in others all 
were voted for upon a general State ticket. The last mode has come 
to prevail, because it gives an advantage to the majority, and the 
party in power wants and expects to get all the electoral votes. But 
election by congressional districts was preferred by the early states¬ 
men. Wilson, Gallatin, and Hamilton expressed themseh'es strongly 
to that effect. Jefferson Avrote : 

A most favorable event would certainly be tbe division of every State into 
districts for the election of Electors. 

And Madison reported: 

The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Consti¬ 
tution was framed and adopted. Tbe States when voting for President by 
general ticket are a string of beads. When they make their election by districts, 
some of these differing in sentiment from others and sympathizing with other 
districts in other States, they are so knit together as to break the force of those 
geographical and other noxious parties which might render the repulsive too 
strong for the cohesive force within the political system. 

Certainly the district system of election seems the fairer, as it 
would give voice to majorities in the seATral districts Avhich might 
be different from the majority in the State as a Avhole, and it Avould 
render the Electoral College more nearly the counterpart it Avas in¬ 
tended to be of the Xational Legislature. Logically, the Iflectors cor¬ 
responding to RepresentatiA'Cs, ought to be elected in the same man¬ 
ner and by the same constituencies as the Representatives. Avhile the 
tAAo that correspond to Senators should be elected by the State at 
large. Thus, also, A\muld the College become more intimately rejU'e- 
sentative of all the people of all the States. 

PROPOSED PLAN CONSTITI'TIONAL. 

The plan here advocated Avould give the Constitution a chance. It 
is a restoration of the system designed by the creators of our Gov¬ 
ernment, with important modifications required by the deA^eloped ca¬ 
pacity and enlightenments of the electorate. They intended that 
•‘the sense of the people should operate’^through a body of men 
assembled from every part of every State^and knoAving the popular 
will from their intimate relations with the people. It is here pro¬ 
posed that the body of chosen delegates shall receive directly the ad- 


the electoral college. 


13 


vice of the people, their own personal knowledge supplemented bv 

metffi combination of tlm old and new 

methods would go far toward taking the presidency out of politics, 
as It was conceived by the fathers. To them the States were the 
tamiliar theaters of party contests, their varying interests causing 
divisions within themselves on diverse issues. Supposing that par 
tisan contentions would be confined within State boundaries, thev 
)e eld the Rational Executive raised above parties, presiding impar¬ 
tially over the destinies of federated States. This is a nobler, grander 
ideal of the presidency than the reality it has become, a party chief 
raised to power by methods which, in winning him victory, have also 
won distrust. 

The Presidency of this Nation 4s too splendid a prize to be safely 
thrown into the arena of personal ambition. It should be bestowed 
unsought, the office seeking the man. If it be objected that this plan 
is undemocratic, it should be answered that it is possibly the most 
truly democratic that can be devised for a large constituency. Pure 
democracy can only be exercised over a small area, where the entire 
body of voters in mass meeting pass ordinances and elect officers, as 
in Swiss cantons and New England towns. When the political unit 
is enlarged, composed of many parts, its democracy becomes forth¬ 
with representative. Kepresentatives are chosen to enact laws affect¬ 
ing every vital interest, and by representatives our Presidents are. 
in fact, selected. The question here is whether these shall be self- 
constituted representatives, the bosses of disorderly conventions, or 
shall be the body created for that especial service by our venerated 
Constitution. Should the satisfaction of expressing by ballot a choice 
among candidates A, B, C, and D, dictated severally by agencies 
•over which w^e have no control, be greater than that of accepting 
finally a choice made by agents lawfully elected and advised by 
the people and responsible to them for the proper execution of their 
solemn trust? A choice made by the people through their grand 
committee, the Electoral College, would be truly their own choice. 
There is no conceivable machinery through Avhich they could act 
more directly with more reality of control. 

As has often been remarked, the authors of the Constitution builded 
better than they knew. In devising only the principal great agen¬ 
cies of government, with only general specifications and restrictions 
of power, they created an organism which has harmonized with all 
environments, proved equal to every neAv condition, and controlled 
successfully an undreamed-of expansion. As provisions little under¬ 
stood have been found of vital efficacy when brought into action by 
legislative enactment or judicial decision, to meet arising needs, we 
may be sure our ancient charter holds latent the means of present 
safety. Some statesman of the early days, divining the tremendous 
potencv of the commerce clause, called it “a sleeping giant in the ^ 
Constitution.” So “ that abandoned provision, the electoral college,” 
iday prove to be a veiled savior. 

III. The President’s Term. 

(From the Washington Herald, Jan. 12, 1913.) 

The reasons for limiting a President of the United States to (me 
term, whether of four or six years, have been ably presented in the 
Senate, to the effect that the efforts of the incumbent and his sup- 


14 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


porters to elect him a second time are a prolific source of political 
corruption and demoralization of public business, including misuse 
of the power of appointment, solicitation of aid from wealthy in¬ 
terests with the hope of favor in return, collection and expenditure 
of huge campaign funds, influencing of legislation by the use of 
patronage, packing of nominating conventions, coercion of officers 
and employees of the Government and of corporations in their exer¬ 
cise of the suffrage. The effects upon the President are said to be 
degrading, distracting his attention from the duties of his office, 
converting him from the head of the Nation to the chief of a party, 
and forcing him upon the stump as a partisan campaigner, to the 
great impairment of his official dignity. 

These evils seem to be not at all inherent in the office or the con¬ 
ditions which properly surround it, or in a second term, but morbid 
growths from our system of selecting candidates. To-morrow the 
Electors “ appointed ” at the general election November 5 last, will 
assemble in their several State capitals, record their votes for Presi¬ 
dent and Vice President, and certify the same to Congress, to be 
opened and counted in the presence of the two Houses on the second 
Wednesday in February. Needless to say the electors have had no 
voice in selecting the persons for whom they Avill vote. These have 
been designated by certain irresponsible assemblages of politician^, 
held last summer with more or less credit and eclat. 

DEPARTURE FROM CONSTITUTION.= 

This system of selection is a wide departure from the constitutional 
method, which was ideal in intention. The Constitution provided 
that the President should be chosen by the Electors of all the States, 
equal for each to the number of Senators and Representatives. As 
was probably necessary at the time, in view of diversity of conditions 
in different parts of the country, the^nanner of “ appointing ” Elec¬ 
tors was left to be determined by the legislature; but through the 
steady growth of Democratic sentiment it came about in 70 years that 
all the Electors were elected by direct vote of the people. Thus they 
are now chosen, and if they were permitted to assemble in convention 
and nominate the candidates for whom their formal Amtes should be 
cast, the system would indeed be ideal. 

In recent articles in the Forum I have shown Iioav the authors of 
the Constitution provided at first that the electors of all the States 
should assemble as a “ Grand Electoral College,” and both select and 
elect the President; but afterAvards, in vieAv of difficulties of travel, 
arranged that they should meet in the States and certify their votes 
to the Congress. Thus the Electors were rendered powerless to make 
a choice and were consequently compelled to accept and Amte for 
candidates dictated by congressional caucuses, and later by party 
conventions, but Congress ought to authorize the electors to assemble 
for conference and the nomination of candidates. Nominating con¬ 
ventions then would be needless, and ought to be prohibited as fore¬ 
stalling the choice (i. e., impairing the freedom) of the Electors, 
Avho are constitutional officers of the GoAwnment. 

In electing the Electors themselves, the most improved devices of 
democracy (such as nomination by primary election in each con- 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


15 


gressional district) should be employed, to procure men representa¬ 
tive individually of their constituencies, and collectively of the public 
opinion of the Nation. The electors should also be advised by a 
presidential preference vote of the people, given without previous 
nomination, and properly tabulated for study. Thus selected and 
thus instructed, the Electoral College would be the best agency pos¬ 
sible for electing the President. On election day we, the entire body 
of voters, would deposit our ballots, every voter of us having Avritten 
on his ballot (if he so desired) the name of his preference for Presi¬ 
dent. By the same ballots Ave would appoint from among ourselves 
a committee of respectable citizens to sift and analyze our preference 
votes and select the best man. The procedure of this committee of 
531 Electors has been explained in the former articles. 

Let it be conceded at once that the election of President by direct 
vote of the people (if any regard such method as desirable) is unat¬ 
tainable. By that method the voting population Avould act en masse, 
State lines Avould be obliterated, and the smaller States would lose 
the advantage secured to them by our Federal system in giving them 
a vote in the college for every Senator and Kepresentative. Also 
previous nominations would be more necessary than ever, and the 
voters Avould become more than ever the blind puppets of irresponsi¬ 
ble conventions. The States will hesitate a long time before amend¬ 
ing the Constitution in this line. But by very simple legislation, 
and without change in the Constitution, we may perfect our present 
system so it Avill operate as the fathers intended, furnishing a lawful 
nominating body and authoritative election agency. I believe careful 
reflection on the subject Avill convince candid minds that the people 
will influence and control the election of Presidents, as far as it can* 
be controlled by them, when their ^and committee, the Electoral 
College, exercises its full powers. J 

LENGTH OF TER3I A SUBJECT FOR PLATFORMS. 

The effective operation of the constitutional method of election 
would cure the abuses alleged to result from the possibility of re- 
election. The length of the President’s term and his eligibility to 
successive terms were fully considered by the fathers. For weighty 
reasons, after debating proposals of six years and seven years, they 
adopted a term of four years and declined to restrict the number of 
terms. Kecall Bancroft’s narrath^e respecting the mode of electing 
the President: 

The Constitutional Convention at first reluctantly conferred that office on the 
National Legislature, voting in joint ballot. To escape from danger of cabal and 
corruption it next transferred full and final power of choice to an Electoral 
College that should be an exact counterpart of the joint convention of the two 
Houses of Congress and should meet at the seat of government. * * * From 

confidence in the purity of the electoral body thus established, the reeligibility 
of the ExecutiA^e was again aflarmed. 

Their thought was that if the President were elected by the Con¬ 
gress or by popular vote he ought to be limited to one term, which 
might be as long as seven years, but if chosen by a carefully selected 
college of electors great advantage would result from a shorter 
term with eligibility to reelection. A President who should prove 
a failure would not burden the country overlong, while the services 


16 


THE ELECTOKAL COLLEGE. 


of an able and popular President would be extended almost as a 
matter of course bv a quiet reelection. From Washington we re¬ 
ceived the uiiAvritten hiAv of two terms only. With that limitation, 
the Presidency is so admirable an institution per se that the most 
radical progressives and most timid conservatives may well unite 
in keeping it as it is. The reeligibility of the Executive renders the 
office adaptable to the character of the man and the circumstances 
of the times, and a self-governing enlightened people may safely 
remain the guardian of the two-term tradition. The establishment 
of a one-term rule also ought to be left to the people without con¬ 
stitutional restriction. This question has as yet received little gen¬ 
eral discussion, but is properly a subject for party platforms as a 
means of testing public opinion. 

The fault is in our system of nominating candidates and conduct¬ 
ing campaigns, and thither ought the efforts of reformers to be 
directed. Party organizations are purely voluntary and their nomi¬ 
nating conventions altogether irresponsible. The will of the people 
has but a remote influence over them, and they present candidates 
who may be or may not be the choice of a majority even of their own 
party. The candidates then spend laborious months, each striving 
to prove himself acceptable to his own partj" and then to win enough 
support from other ])arties to insure his election. The personal 
element is exaggerated, abuse and misrepresentation are rife, money 
is collected dubiously and expended injuriously, excitement prevails, 
business suffers, issues of principle and policy are neglected. Tf 
the President be a candidate, he is charged with using the Federal 
patronage and all the powers of his office to secure his nomination 
and further his election. Recent events furnish pointed illustra¬ 
tions. One of our distinguished publicists writes: 

For nearly 20 years two ix)werfiil and interesting personalities have domi¬ 
nated the imagination of large elements of the American people, and when 
either of them is before the electorate as a candidate for high office it is almost 
impossible to secure discussion of any political proposal save with reference 
to his personality. The effect of this limitation upon our political life has 
not been happy. Passionate feeling has been aroused at a time when cool reason 
was most necessary, and blind personal advocacy or blind personal antagonism 
has taken the place of statesmanlike examination of principles. 

WOULD CORRECT ABUSES. 

Under the correct system there would be none of all this. There 
would be no need of it and no opportunity for it. The candidate 
would not be in evidence until the last act of the drama, but his way 
would be prepared by statesmen and publicists proclaiming party 
purposes and expounding party doctrine through conventions, the 
press, and public speeches. The people would then select by the best 
means that can be devised a body of men whom they know or can 
know all about, to act as their “ grand committee ” in naming the 
President, under such instructions as it may be possible to give by a 
popular preference vote. 

It is objected that the Electoral College would be subject to 
severe pressure and violent solicitation, and might be corrupted or 
purchased outright. This is only to say that electors are men. Men 
are mortal and fallible, and it is freely admitted that no human in- 


THE ELECTOEAL COLLEGE. 


17 


struinent is perfect. But as ^Ye can not resort to a convocation of 
angels, we must employ the best human agency to be obtained. Here 
the judgment of the fathers is sound: 

It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of 
the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be 
answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, 
but to men chosen for the special purpose and at the particular juncture. 

And again: 

The mode least favorable to intrigue and corruption, that in which the un¬ 
biased voice of the people would be most attended to, and that which will be 
least likely to terminate in violence and usurpation, ought to be adopted. 

If the function of the Electors were made a reality they, as average 
honorable Americans selected by their fellow citizens for a solemn 
trust, would feel their responsibility keenly. They would be pro¬ 
tected and restrained by a thorough corrupt-practices law, their 
brief official existence would be spent and their duty performed in 
the very glare of publicity. It takes but a feeble optimism to pre¬ 
dict that corruption among them would be practically nonexistent. 
A sentiment of official integrity would grow around an Elector which 
would soon become traditional. It Avould be as unseemly to attempt 
to bias an Elector as a judge on the bench. Obviously it would be 
impossible for a President to communicate with the Electors. Thej" 
•would assemble to make their choice within 30 days of their own 
election. Their outgoings and incomings meantime, as well as the 
President's, would be observed of all men. If not restrained by a 
high sense of propriety he would be hindered by the difficulties of 
the situation from exerting any influence over them, and they should 
be prohibited by law from receiving from the person elected any 
office or benefit directly or indirectly. His road to reelection then 
would not be the corralling of delegates to the convention, or giving 
and promising office, or favoring corporations, but an able and 
patriotic administration of the Government. Upon the select body 
of men who would govern destiny none of the evil influences referred 
to above would have any power. 

It would seem that before attempting to amend the Constitution 
either as to the President’s term and eligibility or as to the manner of 
electing him, we ought to try the results of making the constitutional 
method effective. Give the Constitution a chance. To institute this 
reform a brief act should be passed at an early day prohibiting the 
nominating of candidates for President and Vice President by con¬ 
vention or otherwi.se, providing for a presidential preference vote 
addressed to the electors, and requiring the a.ssembling of the next 
Electoral College for the purpose of nominating. Thus would the 
public be informed in advance. Afterwards the details could be care¬ 
fully studied and further provisions found necessary could be made 
in a supplemental act or in the appropriation bill for the proper year. 

In no reactionary spirit, therefore, but with views thoroughly pro¬ 
gressive, the writer urges a return for relief to the wisdom of the 
fathers by making effective their admirable device—the Electoral 
College. This may be accomplished by a surprisingly simple enact- 

S. Doc. I Of >2, 62-3-2 


18 


THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE. 


inent, and in conclusion of the argument there is here submitted a 
draft of what may be called a bill of assistance, as follows: 


A niLIi To a.ssist the Presuleiitial Electors in the performance of their duties. 

Whereas the Constilntion confers on tlie Electors the full power to elect the 
President and Vice President of the United States; and 
Whereas it was the original plan of the authors of the Constitution that the 
Electors should assemble in one place and jierform their function as a united 
bodj' or college, but this plan was changed in view of the difficulties of travel 
of that time; and 

AVhereas by reason of developed political capacity of the people it is now 
believed to be possible and right for the voters to express their preferences 
among candidates for office: Now, therefore, 

Be it enacted hy the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That in the years in which a Presi¬ 
dent is to be elected there shall be placed on the ballots used in voting for 
Representatives in Congress words to this effect, “ Here the voter may write the 
name of his choice for President of the United States,” and below them shall 
be provided a blank line; and when the ballots are counted in each State all 
names written thereon by the voters which have received more than one. thou¬ 
sand votes each shall be tabulated, with the number of votes for each, and the 
tabulation shall be certified to the Electors and shall be published; and nomi¬ 
nations for the office of President or Vice President in any manner other than 
as herein prescribed shall be unlawful, and every person who shall attempt 
to effect such unlawful nominations shall be liable to a fine of not less than 
$200 and imprisonment for not less than two months. 

Sec. 2. The Electors appointed in all the States shall assemble as the Elec¬ 
toral College within thirty days from their appointment, to confer respecting 
and to nominate suitable persons for President and Vice President. They shall' 
be allowed adequate compensation and provision for expenses and such secre¬ 
taries, clerks, and other assistants as they may find necessary, and appropriations 
shall be made therefor as for other expenses of the Government. 


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